Rationality

Mr. Planck says that the definition I used for rationality, which is the proper function of our rational faculties, “tells us little.” He prefers to define rationality as “restricting one’s self to the limits of reason.” But my definition is not contradictory to his. [1] By “proper function of rational faculties,” I do include things like the laws of logic. If our rational faculties are not functioning properly, then we are irrational in what we believe. If our rational faculties are designed in such a way to obey the laws of logic, to disbelieve in the laws of logic would be irrational just as if a pencil cannot write, then we should not write with it. If a certain object has a certain design which cannot function properly, then it is not doing what it is supposed to do. So too if our rational faculties are designed to think abstractly and to discover the external world, if it does not function, it is not doing what it is supposed to do.

Mr. Planck says, “Without parsimony, an infinite number of states of affairs are possible.” I do not see why there cannot be a possibility of an infinite number of states of affairs. [2] If there is a Divine Unlimited Mind which can think of an infinite number of possible states of affairs, then it surely is possible. I just do not see the problem.

Then Mr. Planck makes the remark, “In its shortest form, my response is that you are not rational for believing you ate a chicken yesterday if your only evidence is your memory.” I have to disagree with this for a couple of reasons. First, this suggests that we are irrational in believing something even if it is true. For example, let us say that I did eat chicken. That is truly what I did. But I do not have any other evidence except my memory. This means that I am irrational for believing in truth. This is against common sense because reason is usually designed towards truth. Second, just because our memories can be wrong, it does not mean it is irrational to believe in our memory alone. If our memories are wrong, it is the faculty which is not functioning properly which gives us a wrong idea of what happened in the past. But this does not mean that if our “memory” faculties are functioning properly, we cannot be justified in believing on what we simply remember.

Evidence

Mr. Planck defines what “evidence” is: “Evidence that cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be reproduced or tested for in the external world, is not evidence.” This is wrong for many reasons. First, this means that we are not rational in believing in induction. What evidence is there that the future will be like the past? What evidence is there that the sun will rise tomorrow? The consequence of Mr. Planck’s thesis is that we are not justified in using neither induction for what will happen tomorrow, like the sun rising, cannot be “tested” nor “reproduced.”

Second, it is a self-contradiction. Nowhere does Mr. Planck have any evidence for his thesis that we must have “external confirmation.” What external confirmation does Mr. Planck have in believing that we must have an external confirmation of everything in order to be rational? If Mr. Planck does not have an external confirmation, then he is irrational by his own definition. Is it testable that everything must be testable? Is it empirical that everything must be empirical? Third, if we accept Mr. Planck’s thesis, we must reject a lot of things we hold dear in our minds like aesthetics, mathematics, love, and even the laws of logic. The laws of logic are not “testable.” In fact, they are prior to the external world. In order for there to be an external world, the laws of logic must apply. In order for the earth to exist, it must be true that the earth and no-earth cannot exist at the same time; if the earth exists, then no-earth is not true.

Necessity of Evidence?

Mr. Planck says that “Mr. Latar seems confused on this point, both asserting that said evidence does exist, and asserting that it is not necessary.” I do not think I am. Just because evidence is not necessary for rationality, it does not mean that there is no evidence. God can design the mind in such a way that one can discover Him through experience and no evidence, or through a demonstration like the ontological argument. If evidence is not necessary, does it matter if evidence exists? The answer is, just because evidence is not necessary for the rationality of religious belief, it does not mean that everyone will not need evidence. For some, it may be that they are only persuaded by demonstrations. If they believe in God after reading Aquinas’ Proofs, for example, it does not make them anymore rational than those who did not have to read Aquinas’ Proofs in order to believe in God.

If God designed our minds in such a way that it is directed through Him, it does not mean that the means we move toward Him must be the same. I can see the Twin Towers fall on T.V. and my aunt could have seen it in person. Just because the “vehicles” we used are different, it does not make one of us less rational than the other. So just because evidence is not necessary for rationality, it does not mean one cannot discover God through evidence.

Conclusion

I think I still have the stronger position. Let me restate the positive arguments I have given throughout this debate which have still yet to be defeated.

(1) In the absence of rational defeaters, why should I disbelieve in God if I experienced Him through reading the Bible? Just as I can use induction even though I do not have any evidence, and because there is no good reason why I should not, so too I should be justified in believing in God.

(2) If God designed our minds in such a way that we can discover Him, then even if there is no evidence, why am I irrational in believing in God?

Notes

[1] Although I have to say, “restricting to one’s self to the limits of reason” can imply that faith is in itself irrational. Maybe that is what Mr. Planck is getting at, but I believe there is such a thing as a reasonable faith, which is what I am arguing.

[2] What is a “state of affair” is another subject of debate in philosophy.

JMJ,

Apolonio Latar III

Words: 1100 approx