On Evidence

In Mr. Planck’s second rebuttal he said,

“In its shortest form, my response is that you are not rational for believing you ate a chicken yesterday if your only evidence is your memory.”

Then, on the third rebuttal he said,

“Of course I did not mean to imply that your memory is untrustworthy to the point where you are irrational for believing you had chicken for dinner unless you carry the bones around with you. But having chicken for dinner is a wholly ordinary claim; merely ordinary evidence (such as memory) generally suffices.”

So we can see that there is a contradiction in his statements. He now seems to have changed his position to “ordinary claims only need ordinary evidences.”

There are a couple of problems with this. First, without begging the question, without being arbitrary, what exactly is an “extraordinary” claim? Is “The Boston Red Sox will win the World Series” an extraordinary claim? Second, I do believe that believing in God is an ordinary claim after what I have argued in this debate. I have argued that if God designed our minds in such a way that it has an intellectual capacity or an ability to discover Him, then it is rational to believe in Him. In this sense, believing in God simply means that our cognitive faculties are functioning the way they are supposed to and therefore it is “ordinary” to believe in God. If God designed our minds in such a way that we can discover Him, if we do not discover him, then our minds are not functioning properly. This means that if we say, “God does not exist,” we are saying something “out of the ordinary,” or something abnormal. So I would argue that believing that God exists is ordinary.

Mr. Planck’s Argument against My First Point

My first argument for the rationality of religious belief is that in the absence of rational defeaters, we are rational in religious belief through religious experience. With this he says, “Reading the Bible, and having a personal reaction, is not experience of God; it is merely experience of reading the Bible.” The problem with that is that Mr. Planck does not have evidence that I am simply experiencing reading the Bible. I do not believe what I experienced is simply reading the Bible. I believe that when I read the Bible, I experienced God Himself, Someone transcendent and as well as immanent. I encountered God in the Person of Jesus Christ. For Mr. Planck to simply say that I am not experiencing God, he must give a rational defeater for this. He cannot simply state I am not experiencing God. In short, I have given an undercutting defeater-defeater -- that I have no good reason to believe that I am simply experiencing the reading of the Bible.

Mr. Planck’s Argument against My Second Point

Mr. Planck says, “Arguably God designed our minds in such a way as to allow us to discover guilt or innocence at a court trial, but that hardly entitles us to reach a conclusion unsupported by the evidence presented.” That analogy, however, fails. I have argued that if God designed our minds in such a way that we can discover Him through experience, or even without evidence, then it is a “properly basic belief” or rational for us to believe in God without evidence or simply through experience.

Induction, Logic, and Rationality

Mr. Planck says, “We do have evidence of induction: all of our past history. And we can test induction: you are free at any time to drop a pencil, and observe if it falls just as it did the last time you dropped it. Now, it is true you cannot prove that the next time you drop the pencil, it will fall: but you can certainly test the proposition, as often as you'd like.”

The problem with this is that we do not have, at the moment, both proof or evidence for induction. You cannot test nor prove what will happen in the future. You cannot test the proposition “The sun will rise tomorrow” simply because (1) it hasn’t reached that time yet, and (2) it commits the fallacy that “the future will be like the past.” Mr. Planck thinks I am failing to distinguish between “proof” and “evidence” when in fact I have given thought to both. The simple answer is that it does not have both.

As far as the laws of logic are concerned, he said, “Our evidence for logic is that it works; our evidence for the laws of logic is that without them logic doesn't exist.” But notice how he does not have “testable” evidence. The laws of logic are not something tangible; it is not empirical. Yes, there may be an external world, but that is not “evidence.” That is why Aristotle has called it a “principle of knowledge.” We cannot prove it nor have evidence for it, but we must presuppose it in order to actually think correctly. Again, Mr. Planck has no empirical evidence for the laws of logic. Saying that “it works” is hardly an “evidence.”

What’s the significance of this? I have argued that we do not need evidence in order to be rational in believing in God. Mr. Planck has argued that “to be rational does mean having evidence for everything.” But we do not have evidence for either induction or the laws of logic. That directly contradicts his thesis.

Truth and Rationality

Mr. Planck said, “Another point about rationality must be made clear: it is in fact irrational to believe in things that are true, if you lack reason and evidence for your view.” Let me give the example I have given in my opening statement:

Mr. X died by falling off the roof. I was in the library when this happened. But people are claiming that I pushed him. The evidence may even be against me. One person says that the last time he saw Mr. X is with me. Another found out that I have a history of assault. Another says that I had a hatred for Mr. X. Finally, someone saw a Filipino with glasses with Mr. X when he fell. I fit the description. Now, I do not have any “evidence” with me that I was in the library. I did not borrow a book or leave any evidence behind to show that I was in the library. But the fact was, I was in the library. My memory is working properly and I remember I was in the library. Mr. Planck wants us to believe that we are not rational for believing I was in the library.

Instead, if I was put into court, the evidence may be against me and I might be given capital punishment. Mr. Planck’s thesis logically follows that I should be given the death penalty. Why? Because I do not have any evidence for my innocence. Mr. Planck may answer by saying, “Well, it’s tough luck. But that’s how the system works.” But the question is, am I irrational to believe that I did not murder Mr. X; that I was in the library when it happened? If that is what actually happened, if that is true, why am I irrational for believing it?

States of Affairs and Elves

Let us take the proposition:

“Multiple states of affairs could exist.” (P)

He said, “Well, yes, but that's hardly rational. If I ask you where my car keys are, and you say they are simultaneously under the couch and behind the dresser, no one is going to construe that as a rational (or even helpful) response.”

Notice how Mr. Planck’s statement above does not interact with P. P says that “multiple states of affairs could exist.” That certainly is true. It could be that in a possible world W,

“Joe weighs 220 pounds.” (X)

And

“Billy weighs 230 pounds.” (Y)

And

“Alex weighs 240 pounds.” (Z)

Notice how X, Y, and Z are all states of affairs. They are “multiple states of affairs.” Yet, is it impossible that X, Y, and Z can exist? Of course not. There is not logically or even metaphysically contradictions in those states of affairs. So P can certainly be true. In other words, “multiple states of affairs could exist” is a true statement. When I said in my rebuttal that “I do not see why there cannot be a possibility of an infinite number of states of affairs,” I am speaking of how there can be an infinite number of possible worlds. Since a possible world is a possible state of affairs (though not all states of affairs are possible worlds), then I do not see why there cannot be an “infinite number of states of affairs” if there was a Divine Unlimited Mind who can conceive of such. As far as invisible elves are concerned, it is possible that they exist (there may be a possible world where elves do exist). However, unless I have a good reason why I should believe in them, that is, if God reveals to me that they exist or I discover them in some way, then I do not see myself believing in their actual existence. As for God’s existence, I do have a good reason why I believe in Him. I have experienced Him and unless there are rational defeaters for this belief, I am rational in believing in Him.

Conclusion

I believe we still do not have a rational defeater for any of my positions.

Apolonio Latar III

Words: 1600 approx