Induction

There is an obvious disconnect in our positions that seems irreconcilable, and I mention it here only to dispense with it. Mr. Latar continues to assert that we do not have evidence for our inductive claims (such as the sun rising tomorrow). I continue to assert that we have evidence (past history), even if we lack conclusive proof (a deductive proof of induction).

I can only ask the reader to judge for themselves if it is rational to assume that the sun will rise tomorrow, given its unfailing history of obeying the laws of gravitation and inertia. While this must necessarily be a value judgment on the part of each reader about the nature of rationality, I would like to point out that we all do, in fact, act as if the sun rising tomorrow is something we can safely assume.

A consistent theme appears in Mr. Latar's argument. First I will respond to a few specific points, and then I will respond to the general theme.

(1) The experience of God is not an ordinary claim. God is not an ordinary object, like a chicken dinner. To assert such is to stretch the definition of ordinary beyond all recognition.

(2) To assert that reading the Bible produces an experience above and beyond merely reading the Bible is a statement that clearly requires support. I do not need to argue against it; Mr. Latar needs to argue for it. The ordinary experience of reading a book produces the experience of reading a book; any extra claims require some kind of support.

(3) To argue that we know God exists because we can know God is also extraordinary. As counter-evidence, we can know things that are false; and many people do not know God (even though they are apparently mentally competent by all other tests).

What these three claims have in common is that they are possible but not necessary. It could be that one experiences God while reading the Bible; it could also be that one merely thinks one is. One of these positions is parsimonious, and the other one is not. One of these explanations requires the existence of an extra entity.

In other words, Mr. Latar's arguments quite consistently imply and depend upon the rejection of parsimony as a principle of reason. As long as it is possible, Mr. Latar considers that adequate for rationality.

By focusing his arguments in this area, it would appear that he agrees on at least this much: belief in God is irrational if parsimony is required. The original question is now transformed into "Is parsimony necessary to rationality?"

In his rebuttal of parsimony, Mr. Latar has forgotten why we introduced multiple states of affairs in the first place. There is no objection to X, Y, and Z co-existing; there is an objection to X(1), X(2), and X(3) all being equally true.

It is either the case that many, none, or one elf is involved in rain-making. It cannot be the case that one elf and no elves are both causing it to rain. This is the incoherent multiple states of affairs that the rejection of parsimony allows. It is also the violation of the laws of identity, those primary Aristotelian laws of logic we both agreed were crucial to rationality. To assert that A and ~A (not A) can both be true at the same time is a clear contradiction of the second law, that A != ~A.

I argued that without parsimony, we cannot distinguish between multiple stats of affairs. Mr. Latar's rebuttal (that multiple states of affairs do not need to be distinguished) is refuted by the Law of Negation. Thus, to admit Mr. Latar's defense is to reject logic. Clearly, rejecting logic would mean rejecting rationality, and thus we must conclude that Mr. Latar has failed to make his case. [1]

To make believing in God rational, Mr. Latar has rejected the laws of logic, rendered the world a confusing myriad of possible (and contradictory) states, and asserted that the sun might not rise tomorrow. These absurdities have arisen not because Mr. Latar is absurd, but because parsimony is, in fact, necessary and integral to our concepts of reason, rationality, and truth. To abandon it invokes madness.

And Mr. Latar has tacitly conceded that God cannot be protected from parsimony. Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that belief in God is not rational: that is to say, based solely on the public evidence available, no consistent or logical person could deduce the existence of God as a necessary condition of the world. At best God is merely possible; at worst, entirely irrelevant; but in no case, rational.

Notes

[1] This does not mean some other principle besides parsimony could eliminate elves while not eliminating God; it merely means that Mr. Latar has failed to explicate one. But, in the absence of a reasoned argument, we can only go with what we have. We can only decide on the evidence at hand; our judgment cannot depend on evidence that might someday be introduced.

Micheal Planck

Words: 860 approx