I have defended the position that one does not need to have evidence in order to be rational in believing in God. My position has been that religious belief is rational if

(1) there is no rational defeater for the belief

and

(2) if God designed our minds in such a way that we can discover Him through experience, we do not need evidence for God.

Problem of Induction

An analogy I have given is our justified use of induction. If we have no rational defeater of this belief, then we do not need to prove why the sun may rise tomorrow. Also, if God designed our minds in such a way that we can use induction, then we are rational in using it.

Mr. Planck answered by saying that there is evidence for induction, which is past history. That, however, can hardly be evidence without assuming that “the future will be like the past.” He tries to distinguish between evidence and conclusive proof, but I have shown that induction has neither. How exactly can you “test” what will happen tomorrow when it did not get to that point of time? There is no testable or empirical evidence at all. He tries to say that “past history” is evidence, yet, that can be hardly evidence since what is in the past is not the future. Finally, he uses the laws of gravity and inertia as evidence, but that’s fallacious since one already assumes induction in order to discover those laws.

Response to the Points of Mr. Planck

(1) Mr. Planck keeps insisting that the “experience of God is not an ordinary claim.” However, we have not heard any definition from Mr. Planck what exactly is an extraordinary claim. He did not interact with my argument that if our cognitive faculties are designed in such a way that we can discover God, then experiencing Him is “natural.” If we have a natural desire as St. Thomas Aquinas said, then experiencing Him is natural for us, and not anything “extraordinary.”

(2) Mr. Planck says, “To assert that reading the Bible produces an experience above and beyond merely reading the Bible is a statement that clearly requires support.” That’s like saying that if one is listening to music and he experiences a sort of ecstasy, he needs to support the “beauty” or his experience. We experience things that are beyond the empirical many times and we do not need to support it. Music is much more than notes in paper. It also produces a joyful or sad experience when we listen to it. Yet, we do not need “support” for it. So too if we read the Bible and believe God is speaking to us, then we do not need support. Finally, again, if our cognitive faculties are made in such a way that we can discover Him through experience, then the belief produced by reading the Bible is sufficient.

(3) Mr. Planck says, “To argue that we know God exists because we can know God is also extraordinary.” However, that is an inaccurate description of my argument. First, there is nothing in my argument about knowledge of God. This debate is about rationality, not about knowledge or warrant. I have not talked about warrant in this debate, but rather, rationality. Rationality, as I have defined (taking from Plantinga), is proper function. I have given a model by which one can have a religious belief without having any evidence which seems to be effective in this debate.

Mr. Planck then says, “As counter-evidence, we can know things that are false; and many people do not know God (even though they are apparently mentally competent by all other tests).” Again, this debate is not about knowledge. However, in response to his statement, one who does not believe in God, if the model I have presented is true, then his cognitive faculties are not functioning properly.

Parsimony

He says, “By focusing his arguments in this area, it would appear that he agrees on at least this much: belief in God is irrational if parsimony is required.” But this is not true. The model I have presented and the principle of parsimony are not contradictory. Mr. Planck has not shown that they are contradictory. He thinks that by going with the principle of parsimony, he has defeated my position. But in fact, as long as I can offer a defeater-defeater, either undercutting or rebutting, then my position still stands.

He says, “It cannot be the case that one elf and no elves are both causing it to rain.” I do not disagree with this. He misunderstands me thinking that when I said “Multiple states of affairs could exist.” (P) The problem is, P is not the same as “contradictory states of affairs could exist” (P2). A multiple states of affairs need not be contradictory. Again, I have given the examples:

“Joe weighs 220 pounds.” (X)

And

“Billy weighs 230 pounds.” (Y)

And

“Alex weighs 240 pounds.” (Z)

Notice that X, Y, and Z are all multiple states of affairs that are not contradictory. So yes, “multiple states of affairs could exist” can certainly be a true proposition.

Conclusion

I have defended the position that one is rational in believing in God without evidence. I have given a model by which that could be true and I also said that in the absence of rational defeaters, one is justified in believing in God because of his religious experience. I said that there are many times when we simply rely on experience (such as the example I gave about killing Mr. X as well as induction) and the same is true with God. Mr. Planck attempts to refute my position by speaking of the principle of parsimony. However, I have shown that religious experience and the principle are reconcilable and therefore it does not defeat my position.

JMJ

Apolonio Latar III

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